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AVOIDABLE DUE PROCESS CONFUSION:
SPECIAL USE HEARINGS IN ILLINOIS
AFTER KLAEREN
JAMES C. MUNSON & CHRISTI J. GUERRINI

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since its publication on October 18, 2002, the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of
Lisle1 has been misread by nearly every court to consider it and, as
a result, unnecessarily has placed in doubt the due process rights
that Illinois municipalities must guarantee their citizens. Klaeren
addressed a gap in the Illinois Municipal Code that provides for
cross-examination at public hearings on special use permits
conducted by subordinate zoning bodies of large, but not small,
municipalities. Closing this statutory gap, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that, as a matter of procedural due process, all
municipalities are required to provide cross-examination
opportunities at such hearings. Although the issue in the case was
limited to the procedural due process required at special use public
hearings conducted by subordinate zoning bodies, the court
discussed in dicta the substantive due process standard of review
applicable to final decisions made by municipal legislative bodies.
In so doing, the court planted the seeds of confusion that now
threaten to eclipse the decisional rule of Klaeren.
Part II of this Article describes the statutory requirements
applicable to special use hearing conducted by municipal
subordinate zoning bodies that were at the heart of Klaeren. The
Municipal Code, by its terms, guarantees the right to crossexamination at subordinate body special use public hearings
conducted only by municipalities with populations of 500,000 or
more, but not by smaller municipalities.
Part III explains that this procedural statutory gap was the
sole issue considered and decided by the Klaeren trial court,
* James C. Munson is a litigation partner of Kirkland & Ellis LLP and a
graduate of Yale University, B.A., and the University of Wisconsin, J.D.
Christi J. Guerrini is a litigation and intellectual property associate of

Kirkland & Ellis LLP and a graduate of the University of Virginia, B.A., and
Harvard Law School, J.D. This Article does not represent the opinions of
Kirkland & Ellis LLP.
1. 781 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. 2002) [hereinafter Klaeren IIl].
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appellate court, and, finally, the Illinois Supreme Court. 2 Klaeren
concerned a public hearing conducted on a special use application
to develop property in the Village of Lisle, a municipality having a
population less than 500,000. The hearing was conducted jointly
by the village's legislative body and its two subordinate zoning
bodies, and the governing procedures did not permit the crossexamination of witnesses.
Hearing participants subsequently
brought suit against the Village of Lisle on grounds that the denial
of cross-examination at the hearing violated their procedural due
process rights.
The trial court, appellate court, and the Illinois Supreme
Court each held that it was error for the municipality to prohibit
cross-examination at the joint public hearing as a matter of
procedural due process. Part III also explains that the Illinois
Supreme Court also went on to confuse this procedural due process
issue with the altogether different issue of the substantive due
process standard of review applicable to final special use decisions
made by municipal legislative bodies. Because no question of
substantive due process was raised in Klaeren, however, the
opinion's misguided discussion of substantive due process is not
authoritative precedent.
Nevertheless, as described in Parts IV and V, almost every
Illinois court to consider Klaeren wrongly has cited Klaeren's dicta
discussion of substantive due process for the proposition that final
decisions made by municipal legislative bodies are subject to an
administrative standard of substantive review. Part VI explains
that this widespread misreading of Klaeren has troubling
consequences for Illinois municipalities and their citizens. First,
the. confusion of distinct due process doctrines violates basic
principles of stare decisis and, consequently, undermines the
integrity and reliability of the judicial system.
Second, the
misidentification of the applicable standard of substantive review
compels municipalities to make extensive, expensive, yet
unnecessary changes to basic zoning procedures. It is therefore
important to clarify the decisional rule of Klaeren that, as a matter
of procedural due process, all subordinate body special use
hearings must include some opportunity for cross-examination,
and nothing more.
II.

SUBORDINATE BODY SPECIAL USE HEARINGS REQUIRED BY THE
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL CODE

The Illinois Municipal Code defines "special uses" of property

2. People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. (Oct. 18,
1999) [hereinafter Kiaeren 1]; People ex rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 737
N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) [hereinafter Klaeren fl]; Klaeren II, 781

N.E.2d at 223.
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as "public and quasi-public uses affected with the public interest,
uses which may have a unique, special or unusual impact upon the
use or enjoyment of neighboring property, and planned
developments." 3 The special use of property is distinguished from
those uses that are permitted by the local zoning ordinance
governing the property. If a proposed use is not permitted by the
governing ordinance, the property owner may seek an exemption
from the strict application of the ordinance in the form of a special
use permit.
Division 13 of the Municipal Code authorizes the legislative
body, or "corporate authority," of each Illinois municipality to
"provide for the classification of special uses." 4 The corporate
authority may retain for itself the authority to make the final
decision on a special use application or it may delegate that
authority to the municipality's subordinate zoning body, the
"zoning board of appeals." 5 Whether made by the corporate
authority or the subordinate zoning board of appeals, every final
decision on a special use application must be preceded by "a public
hearing before some commission or committee designated by the
6
corporate authorities"-the Zoning Board of Appeals.
The statutory requirements that govern the subordinate body
special use public hearing depend on whether the subject property
is located in a 'large" municipality having a population of 500,000
or more or in a "small" municipality having a population less than
500,000. At hearings conducted by large municipalities, the
Municipal Code guarantees participants four rights, including the
7
right to "cross examine all witnesses testifying" at such hearings.
3. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-1.1 (2002).
4. Id.
5. See id. (stating procedures applicable to the situation wherein the
corporate authority reserves for itself the authority to make the final decision);
id. 5/11-13-7 (setting forth the standard of review applicable to the situation
wherein the Zoning Board of Appeals is authorized to make the final decision);
id. 5/11-13-11 (referring to "[e]very... special use, whether made by the board
of appeals directly, or by an ordinance after a hearing before the board of
appeals"); id. 5/11-13-13 (stating the standard of review applicable to "final
administrative decisions" made by zoning boards of appeals pursuant to
division 13 of the Municipal Code).
The Municipal Code establishes
requirements specific to zoning boards of appeals, including procedures
regarding selecting and compensating members, filling vacancies, determining
quorums, keeping records of proceedings, and voting. Id. 5/11-13-3.
6. Id. 5/11-13-1.1. The Municipal Code elsewhere refers to the municipal
body designated to conduct the section 11-13-1.1 public hearing as a zoning
board of appeals. See id. 5/11-13-7 (referring to the "hearing at which the
application for ... special use is to be considered" that is conducted by the
"board of appeals").
7. Id. 5/11-13-7a(b). The Municipal Code also provides for the right to
have subpoenas issued compelling the appearance of persons at the public
hearing and/or compelling the examination of documents either before or at
the hearing, the right to present witnesses, and, for objectors, the right to one
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The Municipal Code does not specifically guarantee participants
any right at hearings conducted by small municipalities.8
On October 18, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court closed the
procedural gap in the Municipal Code that provides for crossexamination at public hearings on special use permits conducted
by subordinate zoning bodies of large, but not small,
municipalities.
Specifically, in Klaeren, the court held that
procedural due process guarantees the right to cross-examine
witnesses at all subordinate body special use public hearings,
regardless of the size of the municipality conducting them.

III. THE KLAEREN OPINIONS
A.

The Trial Court Opinion

At issue in Klaeren was 60.5 acres of land owned by Saint
Procopious Abbey (the "Abbey Parcel"). 9 Meijer, Inc., a retailer
with stores across the Midwest, contracted to purchase the Abbey
Parcel.' 0 Meijer subsequently filed with the Village of Lisle a
petition to annex the Abbey Parcel to the village and a special use,
planned unit development and rezoning application to allow
Meijer to develop the property for commercial use. 1

continuance for the purpose of presenting rebuttal evidence. Id. 5/11-13-7a(a),

(c).
8. Section 11-13-7a applies by its own terms only to "special use applicants
and property owners, as set forth in Section 11-13-7 of this Act." Id. 5/11-137a. Section 11-13-7, in turn, is expressly limited to "municipalities of 500,000
or more population." Id. 5/11-13-7. There is also a statutory discrepancy in
the notice requirements applicable to special use applications that depend on
population size. For special use applications filed in large municipalities, the
Municipal Code provides detailed notice requirements. First, the applicant
must serve written notice on the owners of all property within 250 feet in each
direction of the subject property. Id. The notice must be served at least thirty
days before the application is filed and must include the following information:
(1) the address of the subject property; (2) a brief statement of the nature of
the requested special use; (3) the name and address of the legal and beneficial
owner of the subject property; (4) a statement that the applicant intends to file
an application for a special use permit; and (5) the approximate date on which
the application will be filed. Id. Second, the applicant must file with the
municipality an application for a special use permit, a list of the names and
last known addresses of the persons required to be served with a copy of the
application, and a written statement certifying that the applicable service
requirements have been satisfied. Id. This information must be filed with the
board of appeals, which is prohibited from considering a special use
application until all of this information is provided. Id. By contrast, the
Municipal Code has no notice requirements applicable to special use
applications filed in small municipalities. See id. (limiting special use notice
requirements to "municipalities of 500,000 or more population").
9. Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 225.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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On July 9, 1998, the village conducted a public hearing on
Meijer's petition and application. 12 Initially, each of the village's
three municipal zoning bodies-the Board of Trustees, the Zoning
Board of Appeals, and the Plan Commission-convened separate
hearings at Village Hall. 13 Because the village expected a large
crowd, however, each body independently moved to recess its
hearing and to reconvene in a joint hearing at a local junior high
school auditorium. 14 The 500-seat auditorium was filled beyond
15
capacity.
At the outset of the joint public hearing, the village mayor,
who presided over the hearing, announced the governing
procedures:
This is a public hearing. It is not a debate. There will be no
attempt at tonight's hearing to answer any question raised by the
audience.
To the extent possible the speaker will address questions and
concerned [sic] raised by the combined boards this evening.
The petitioner will be first subject to any questions by the assembled
boards. We will attempt to deal with each individual aspect of the
presentation as it's made. People in the audience speaking in favor
of the proposal will then be heard. People in the audience speaking
in opposition of the proposal will then be heard. The petitioner will
then be allowed to make closing comments. After closing comments
by the petitioner, the public hearing will be adjourned....
To be fair to everyone in the audience, I ask that you limit your
comments to two minutes each. I will be the time keeper and will
let you know when 15 seconds remain.
No one will be allowed to speak a second time until everyone has an
will also be applicable
opportunity to speak once. That requirement
16
to members of the assembled boards.
After the mayor laid down these ground rules, representatives
of Meijer gave a presentation in support of Meijer's application
17
No limits were
that lasted two hours and twenty minutes.
placed on the length of the presentation or on the number of
questions that members of the presiding bodies were allowed to
ask the Meijer representatives.
8
Afterwards, those in attendance were allowed to comment.'

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
See Klaeren I, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. at 2 (Oct. 18, 1999).
See Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 226.
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Forty-seven persons spoke during this session, which lasted
approximately seventy minutes. 19 Eight speakers were warned
when their two minutes were almost up, and five speakers were
cut off when they exceeded the time limit. 20 When one speaker
representing a group that had collected over 2,000 signatures on a
petition opposing the development requested permission for nine
representatives to make brief presentations on behalf of the group,
the mayor responded that only one person would be allowed to
speak on behalf of the organization and that the two-minute time
limit would be enforced. 21 The mayor explained:
Rather than try and debate with you the procedure we are going to
try and follow, I tried to explain at the beginning of the meeting.
My instructions would give everyone who wants to speak or had a
written comment an opportunity to be heard. I think that is fair.
No matter what we do it is going to be characterized as being unfair.
That being the case, we are going to proceed with the suggestion I
22
made.
Finally, those in the audience were not allowed to question
the persons who spoke on behalf of Meijer. 23 As the mayor himself
later acknowledged, "cross-examination as we would know it in
this room was not part of the process." 24
Following the joint public hearing, the Zoning Board of
Appeals and Plan Commission each considered the evidence
presented at the hearing and recommended to the Board of
Trustees that it deny Meijer's zoning requests. 25 On February 11,
1999, property owners residing within 250 feet of the parcel at
issue filed a complaint against the Village of Lisle, seeking, inter
alia, an injunction to prevent the Board of Trustees from
approving Meijer's applications. 26
The trial court held that
plaintiffs failed to name a necessary party and denied the
injunction.27 On February 15, 1999, the Board of Trustees adopted
ordinances and approved resolutions annexing, rezoning, and
granting a special use permit for the Abbey Parcel. 28
The
plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add Meijer and the
Saint Procopious Abbey as defendants and, on September 14,
1999, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Klaeren I, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. at 2.
See Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 227.
See Klaeren II, 737 N.E.2d at 1105.
Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 226
See id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id.
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29
prohibiting Meijer from proceeding with site preparation.
Judge Bonnie Wheaton of the Circuit Court in Wheaton,
DuPage County held a six-day hearing on the plaintiffs' request
for a preliminary injunction and, on October 18, 1999, issued a
twelve-page memorandum opinion and order enjoining Meijer
from developing the Abbey Parcel. 30 Defining the "primary issue"
31
as "the adequacy of the public hearing," the court held that the
village could not "totally deny" the plaintiffs "the right to question
32
As
witnesses for the petitioners" at the joint public hearing.
constitutional
the
both
cited
court
the
decision,
its
for
authority
right to procedural due process and the statutory requirement for
a "public hearing," which necessarily means "the right to...
examine the witnesses whose testimony is presented by opposing
parties." 33 Because the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim that they were improperly denied crossexamination opportunities at the joint public hearing, the court
voided the ordinances at issue and ordered that no further action
be taken on the Abbey Parcel "until further order of Court or until
to the statutes of the
a proper public hearing is held pursuant
34
State of Illinois and its own ordinances."

B. The Appellate Court Opinion
The defendants subsequently brought an interlocutory appeal
of the trial court's preliminary injunction order, and, on October
13, 2000, a divided panel of the Illinois Appellate Court, Second
District, affirmed.3 5 Writing for a two-person majority, Justice
Hutchinson limited the opinion to two issues raised by the
defendants: (1) whether "plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their claim because due process does not require crossexamination in a zoning hearing"; and (2) whether "plaintiffs are
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim because 36Illinois
statutory law does not create a right to cross-examination."
The court ultimately ruled that it was unnecessary to resolve
the first question because, in answer to the second question, the
right to cross-examination is guaranteed by the Municipal Code.
The court first observed that the Municipal Code requires every
municipality to conduct a "public hearing" before making a final
decision on a special use application. Citing E&E Hauling, Inc. v.

29.

Id.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Klaeren I, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. at 11-12.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 4, 8 (quoting Braden v. Much, 87 N.E.2d 620, 623 (Ill. 1949)).
Id. at 12.
Klaeren I, 737 N.E.2d at 1114.
Id. at 1104.
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County of DuPage,3 7 the court then held that the term "public
hearing" as it is used in the Municipal Code is, by definition, a
hearing involving cross-examination: "The word 'hearing' in the
zoning provisions of the Municipal Code has the meaning adopted
by this court in E&E Hauling and includes the right of crossexamination. '38 Accordingly, every subordinate body special use
"public hearing" required by section 11-13-1.1 must
provide some
opportunity for cross-examination, regardless of the size of the
municipality conducting that hearing. 39 Because the joint zoning
hearing on the special use application in Klaeren was a section 1113-1.1 "public hearing," the village's complete denial of crossexamination opportunities at that hearing violated the plaintiffs'
0
statutory rights.4
In so doing, the court rejected as "absurd" the defendants'
argument that, by' explicitly recognizing the right to crossexamination at special use public hearings conducted by large
municipalities, section 11-13-7a excluded the right to crossexamination at special use public hearings conducted by small
municipalities.41 The court explained that the Municipal Code
does not intend to provide fewer procedural safeguards to small
municipalities than to large municipalities. 42
Rather, the
statutory distinction in procedures is intended only to give smaller
municipalities greater flexibility in fashioning procedural rules:
"[I]n smaller municipalities it is more difficult to adopt a per se
rule defining which adjoining landowners are so adversely affected
by the determination that they should be entitled to additional
procedural safeguards."43 Thus, the Municipal Code implicitly
intends the rights guaranteed at subordinate body special use
public hearings conducted by large municipalities to extend to
such hearings conducted by small municipalities: "[T]he list of
rights granted adjoining owners in larger municipalities
demonstrates legislative recognition of the full panoply of rights
envisioned in a public hearing in all municipalities." 44
Although the court affirmed the trial court's decision on
statutory grounds, it did not ignore the procedural due process
issues raised by the plaintiffs. Indeed, the court devoted several
pages to the constitutional principles that govern the right to
cross-examine witnesses at public hearings. 45

37. 396 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).

38. Klaeren II, 737 N.E.2d at 1110.
39. Id. at 1108-10.
40. Id. at 1112.
41. Id. at 1109-10.
42. Id. at 1110.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1106-08.
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First, the court distinguished the doctrine of substantive due
46
The court
process from the doctrine of procedural due process.
explained: "While procedural due process governs the methods by
which the state may deprive an individual of a protected interest,
substantive due process imposes absolute limits on the state's
ability to act without regard to any of the procedural protections
provided."47 The court then noted that plaintiffs did not challenge
"the wisdom of the Village's action," but rather only challenged
"the procedure used by the Village board when it approved the
Thus, the court's opinion necessarily was
development." 48
"addressed solely to the process by which the board reached its
49
decision, not the decision itself."
Turning to the procedural due process issues presented in
Klaeren, the court considered the defendants' argument that there
is no procedural due process right to cross-examination at a zoning
hearing.5 0 Noting the parties' detailed analyses of conflicting case
law in foreign jurisdictions, the court observed that "this is an area
has developed" and so
of the law around which no clear consensus
5 1
declined to consider the issue further.
Next, the court considered the defendants' contention that no
procedural protections were required because the Board of
Trustees had acted in a legislative capacity for substantive due
process purposes.5 2 The court promptly dismissed this argument
on grounds that "simply classifying a process as legislative" for
substantive due process purposes "does not insulate the
underlying procedures from review." 53 Rather, the established
body of law holds that greater procedural protections may be
54
required when legislative action affects a small class of persons.
In such circumstances, additional procedural protections may be
necessary to deter "the extension of special privileges to those wellconnected politically."5 5 Because such additional protections were
provided by the Municipal Code, however, the court56 found it
unnecessary to continue with its constitutional analysis.
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
On October 18, 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the

46. See id. at 1106-07.
47. Id. at 1106.
48. Id. at 1107.

49. Id. at 1113.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 1107-08.
Id. at 1107.
See id. at 1107-08.
Id. at 1108.

54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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judgment of the appellate court, although on different grounds. 57
The court determined that a right to cross-examination exists at
subordinate body special use public hearings in small
municipalities because it is required by procedural due process,
not because it is guaranteed by the Municipal Code. 58 Although
based on constitutional principles rather than statutory
interpretation, the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion had the same
effect of closing the statutory gap created by section 11-13-7a and
requiring opportunities for cross-examination at subordinate body
special use public hearings conducted by all municipalities,
regardless of size.
Like the lower courts that considered the case, the Illinois
Supreme Court expressly limited the issue to whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to cross-examine witnesses at the July
1998 special use joint public hearing. Thus, the court identified
the "primary issue presented by this appeal [to be] whether a
landowner whose property abuts a parcel subject to a proposed
annexation, special use and rezoning petition can be wholly denied
the right to cross-examine witnesses at a public hearing regarding
the petition."5 9 Later, the court emphasized the limited scope of
its review: "On appeal, we examine only whether the party seeking
the injunction has demonstrated a prima facie case that there is a
fair question concerning the existence of the claimed rights."60
Explaining that the fourth element of the prima facie casewhether the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits-was
the "thrust" of the parties' arguments, the court defined success on
the merits in terms of the right to cross-examination:
Success on the merits in this case would be a declaration of the trial
court that any of the village ordinances annexing, rezoning, and
granting a special use for the subject parcel are void due to the
alleged procedural flaws of the joint public hearing. Defendants
maintain that there is no likelihood of success on the merits because
no right to cross-examination exists; plaintiffs and the court below
61
disagreed.
"Having distilled the arguments to focus on this particular
issue" of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to cross-examine
witnesses at the public hearing conducted by the village, the court
assured that it would "similarly tailor [its] discussion" to that
62
issue.
The Illinois Supreme Court opened its discussion by rejecting
the statutory construction argument that was the basis of the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 237.
See id. at 231-35.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
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Second District's opinion. The court held that the Municipal Code
does not implicitly guarantee the "full panoply of due process
rights" at every public hearing conducted by a municipality
because providing the "full panoply of due process rights" is not
always appropriate.6 3 Rather, a reviewing court's determination of
the procedural protections required at a public hearing must be
guided by the purpose of the hearing. 64 Citing U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, the court observed that the purpose of a public
hearing can be described as falling somewhere along a legislativeadministrative spectrum.6 5 At one end of the spectrum are
"legislative" hearings that are directed at and result in the
formulation of general rules. 66 At the other end of the spectrum
are "administrative" or "quasi-judicial" hearings that determine
the rights of one or only a few individuals.6 7 The Illinois Supreme
Court observed that, in general, the closer a public hearing is to
the legislative end of the spectrum, the fewer procedural
protections are required:
[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals,
it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other
hand, when governmental action does not partake of an

adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding
investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full
Therefore, as a
panoply of judicial procedures be used.
generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing
rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated
with different types of proceedings. Whether the Constitution
requires that a particular right obtain in specific proceedings
depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged

right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden
on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into
68
account.

63. Id. at 232-33.
64. See id. at 234-35.
65. See id. (citing Hannah v. Larche, 336 U.S. 420, 442 (1960)).
66. Id. See also Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441, 445 (1915) (ruling that a county regulation increasing the valuation of all
taxable property by forty percent was "legislative" in that it affected all county

residents without exception).
67. See Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 234. See also Londoner v. Denver, 210

U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (holding that an ordinance identifying the amount of a
tax and the persons required to pay it was "administrative" because a
relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds).
68. Klaeren IIl, 781 N.E.2d at 234 (quoting Hannah, 336 U.S. at 442).
Although labeling municipal conduct as legislative or administrative can be
helpful in determining the requisite procedural safeguards, courts repeatedly
remind us that it is "the character of the action, rather than its label," that
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Guided by these principles, the Klaeren court examined the
purpose of subordinate body special use public hearings: "In these
hearings, the property rights of the interested parties are at issue.
The municipal body acts in a fact-finding capacity to decide
disputed adjudicative facts based upon evidence adduced at the
hearing and ultimately determines the relative rights of the
interested parties."6 9 Because subordinate body special use public
hearings typically resolve the rights of only a few individuals, the
court reasoned, they are closer to the "administrative" end of the
legislative-administrative spectrum. Accordingly, participants at
subordinate body special use public hearings "must be afforded the
due process rights normally granted to individuals whose property
rights are at stake."70 Such rights at least include the right to
cross-examine witnesses:
A landowner whose parcel adjoins a tract of land subject to a special
use application cannot be entirely denied the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses at a public hearing regarding the special use
application. The complete denial of such a right to interested
71
landowners runs afoul of due process.
The court concluded that, by "entirely den[ying] the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses" at the July 1998 joint public
hearing, the Village of Lisle violated the plaintiffs' procedural due
72
process rights.
Notwithstanding the court's limitation of the issue to be
decided as one of procedural due process and the court's complete
resolution of that issue, the Klaeren court proceeded to discuss
City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel
Church & Ministries, Inc.,73 which concerned the substantive due
process standard of review to apply to a corporate authority's final
decision on a special use application. 74
determines issues of procedural due process. See Harris v. County of
Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1990). For example, in Harris,the
Ninth Circuit determined that a county authority's general amendment to the
local zoning plan affecting 600,000 acres of property was subject to procedural
due process protections irrespective of the general application of the
amendment. 904 F.2d at 499, 501-02. The court recognized that "[t]he
County's consideration of the vast area contemplated by the General Plan
Amendment certainly affected a large number of people and would not
ordinarily give rise to constitutional procedural due process requirements."
Id. at 502.
However, because the county "specifically targeted [one
individual's] property for a zoning change after notice had been published for
the General Plan Amendment," the court concluded that the individual was
entitled to notice of the change as a matter of procedural due process. Id.
69. KlaerenIII, 781 N.E.2d at 234.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 237.
72. Id.
73. 749 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. 2001).
74. See id. at 924-32.
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According to over forty years of Illinois precedent, the
substantive due process standard of review applicable to a final
decision on a special use application depends on whether the
decision was made by the municipality's legislative body or the
subordinate zoning board of appeals. If the corporate authority
reserves for itself the authority to make the final decision, the
decision must be made by ordinance, 75 which is subject to a
legislative standard of substantive review. 76 If, on the other hand,
the corporate authority reserves for the subordinate zoning board
of appeals the authority to make the final decision, the decision is
subject to an administrative standard of substantive review
77
pursuant to the Administrative Review Law.
The Living Word court observed that this substantive due
process framework applicable to special use decisions is
inconsistent with the "clear weight of authority" in the United
States that all final special use decisions are subject to an
administrative standard of substantive review. 78 Thus, the court
questioned the continued validity of Illinois' substantive due
process framework. 79 Because the issue was not briefed or argued
by the parties, however, the Living Word court declined to resolve
it. o

In Klaeren, the Illinois Supreme Court confused the
substantive due process question in Living Word with the
procedural due process question before it.81
Specifically, the
Klaeren court stated that the substantive due process question left
open in Living Word was "freshly and squarely" presented by
Klaeren, and the court purported to answer that question as
follows:
75. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-11 (distinguishing a special use
decision made "by the board of appeals directly, from a decision made by an
ordinance after a hearing before the board of appeals").
76. See La Grange State Bank v. County of Cook, 388 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ill.
1979); La Salle Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ill.
1957); York v. Vill. of Wilmette, 498 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
Indeed, the enactment of a zoning ordinance is fundamentally a legislative act.
See Anthony v. City of Kewanee, 223 N.E.2d 738, 740 (111. App. Ct. 1967)
("Zoning ordinances are enacted under legislative authority to provide for the
public health, safety and welfare.").
77. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-13. See also Hawthorne v. Vill. of Olympia
Fields, 790 N.E.2d 832, 839 (111. 2003) ("Administrative review is applicable
only where the legislative body transfers to some administrative agency the
authority to administer the ordinance."). The Administrative Review Law
provides a comprehensive framework for judicial review of "final
administrative decisions" in Illinois. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-110. The
common law counterpart to the Administrative Review Law is the writ of
certiorari. See Dubin v. Pers. Bd. of Chi., 539 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (111. 1989).
78. See Living Word, 749 N.E.2d at 925.
79. See id. at 924-26.
80. See id. at 926.
81. See Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 233-34.
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[M]unicipal bodies act in administrative or quasi-judicial capacities
when those bodies conduct zoning hearings concerning a special use
petition. As we stated in Living Word, the "clear weight of
authority" so holds. To the extent any prior decisions of this court
hold the contrary to be true, we now expressly overrule those
82
decisions.
D.

The DecisionalRule of Klaeren

The precedential authority of Klaeren is defined by
established principles of stare decisis.8 3
According to that
doctrine, the binding precedent of a case does not embrace the full
written opinion in which the determination appears.8 4 "Rather,
the authoritative precedent established by a judicial decision must
be extracted from the text of the opinion (or opinions)
accompanying and justifying that decision."8 5 The authoritative
86
precedent established by a judicial decision is binding.
87
Everything else in the opinion is dicta and is not binding.
The process of extracting the authoritative precedent of a case
from the full written opinion is guided by two key principles.
First, a dispositional rule is limited to the facts on which it is
based.8 8 Second, a judicial opinion is authority only for the issues
actually raised by the parties, required for decision, and resolved
by the court.8 9 "[N]othing can be stare decisis which was not in

82. Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
83. See Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5
(1941) ("Rightly understood, stare decisis is a feature of the common law
technique of decision.... The common law technique is based on a conception
of law as experience developed by reason and reason tested and developed by
experience. It is a technique of finding the grounds of decision in recorded
judicial experience, making for stability by requiring adherence to decisions of
the same question in the past, allowing growth and change by the freedom of
choice.").
84. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking,73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1994).
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id. at 14.
87. See id. at 15 ("Thus, all articulations contained in a single-judge opinion
can be classified as either dispositional rules, which enjoy precedential status,
or dicta, which do not."). See also United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292
(7th Cir. 1988) ("What is at stake in distinguishing holding from dictum is that
a dictum is not authoritative. It is the part of an opinion that a later court,
even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject.").
88. See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944)
("Remind[ing] counsel that words of our opinions are to be read in the light of
the facts of the case under discussion."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 399 (1821) (noting that "general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used ....
If
they go beyond the case, they may be respected but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit").
89. See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) ("Questions which merely
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fact considered and determined." 90
Applying these principles to Klaeren, the precise dispositional
rule of Klaeren is that some opportunity for cross-examination is
required at subordinate body special use public hearings
conducted by small municipalities as a matter of procedural due
process. All three courts to rule on that case identified the key fact
as the lack of cross-examination opportunities provided at the joint
public hearing conducted on Meijer's special use application by the
Village of Lisle, a small municipality. 91 Further, all three Klaeren
courts identified the issue raised by the parties and necessary for
decision to be the propriety of the village's complete denial of
cross-examination at that hearing. 92 Finally, all three courts
actually resolved this issue of whether the Village of Lisle should
have provided cross-examination opportunities at the joint public
hearing despite the fact that the Municipal Code does not
guarantee the right to cross-examination at subordinate body
93
special use public hearings conducted by small municipalities.
lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon,
are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute
precedents."); Edlin v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 225 F.2d 80, 82 (7th Cir. 1955) ("A
judicial opinion must be read as applicable only to the facts involved and is
authority for what is actually decided in the case."). A corollary of this
principle is that general expressions may not be used to decide questions not
essential to the determination of the issues before the court. 'That maxim [of
stare decisis] contemplates "[n]ot whatever a court may happen to say, in a
perhaps discursive argument of a cause, or even several causes, but has regard
only to points and adjudications actually involved, as essential elements, in
the questions in actual controversy." Ingham v. Harper & Son, 128 P. 675, 676
(Wash. 1912) (citation omitted).
90. In re Brolasky's Estate, 153 A. 739, 741 (Pa. 1931).
91. Klaeren I, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. at 1-4; Klaeren II, 737 N.E.2d at 1104;
Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 225-30.
92. Klaeren I, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. at 8 (defining the "primary issue" as
"the adequacy of the public hearing" conducted by the Village of Lisle in light
of the fact that it did not allow participants to cross-examine witnesses);
Klaeren II, 737 N.E.2d at 1104 (addressing only the issue of whether plaintiffs
were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim because there exists a
statutory and/or constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses at a special
use public hearing); Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 224-25 (confirming that the
issue on appeal was limited to "whether a landowner whose property abuts a
parcel subject to a proposed annexation, special use, and rezoning petition can
be wholly denied the right to cross-examine witnesses at a public hearing
regarding the petition").
93. Klaeren I, No. 99 CH 179, slip op. at 8 (ruling that the Village of Lisle
could not totally deny plaintiffs the right to cross-examine witnesses at the
special use public hearing because a "public hearing," by definition, means the
right to cross-examine witnesses); Klaeren II, 737 N.E.2d at 1106-10 (holding
that the right to cross-examination at a special use public hearing is
guaranteed by the Municipal Code); Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 230-34
(following U.S. Supreme Court precedent and concluding that because special
use public hearings are more akin to administrative, fact-specific hearings
than legislative, rule-making hearings, participants must be afforded the right
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Accordingly, Klaeren is binding precedent only for the procedural
due process requirement of cross-examination at subordinate body
special use public hearings conducted by all municipalities,
regardless of size.
Klaeren is not authority for the substantive due process
standard to apply to final special use decisions. None of the
Klaeren opinions identified an issue raised by the parties and
necessary for decision to be the validity of the final decision of the
Village of Lisle approving Meijer's special use application, and
none of the Klaeren courts attempted to address that issue. Thus,
to the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court touched upon the
substantive due process question left open by Living Word, that
discussion is dicta and is not binding.
Klaeren's substantive due process discussion is not
authoritative for the additional reason that it is based on a
fundamental misapprehension of due process law. As recognized
by the Second District, procedural due process and substantive
due process are distinct concepts that protect different interests
and are subject to different analytical frameworks. 94 Procedural
due process limits the methods by which a municipality may
deprive interested persons of a protected interest. 95 Substantive
due process, on the other hand, guards against arbitrary decisions
made by a municipality without regard to the procedural
protections provided. 96 Because the two due process doctrines are
distinct and are not interchangeable, it was unnecessary and
improper for the Klaeren court to consider-even in dicta-a
question of substantive due process when only a question of
97
procedural due process was at issue.
to cross-examine witnesses at such hearings).
94. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 901 (2003) ("The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides distinct guarantees of
substantive due process and procedural due process ....
[Tihe categories of
substance and procedure are distinct."). Thus, courts analyze issues of
substantive due process separate and apart from issues of procedural due
process. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-09 (1993).
95. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
96. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992); Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-02; Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
97. See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 2, 7-8 (2003);
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 840 n.4 (expressing no opinion on substantive due process
issue not properly before the Court where the complaint alleged only a
violation of procedural due process); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645
(1997) (distinguishing case law concerning a question of substantive due
process when the case presented only a question of procedural due process).
Cf. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (declining to
consider issue of procedural due process when only issue of substantive due
process was raised).
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IV. THE MISREADING OF KLAEREN AS A SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS DECISION

By requiring cross-examination at subordinate body special
use public hearings in small municipalities, Klaeren worked a
substantial change in the law of special use permits. Until
Klaeren, the Illinois Supreme Court had not recognized the
constitutional right to procedural protections at special use public
hearings conducted by subordinate zoning bodies without
authority to make final decisions. Rather, the controlling case law
at the time held that procedural protections at such zoning
hearings are not required as a matter of procedural due process.

98

Not surprisingly, Klaeren quickly got the attention of local
governments and the legal community. 99
What has been surprising-indeed, alarming-is that almost
every court subsequently to consider the opinion wrongly has
attributed to it a rule of law that was not at issue in Klaeren.
Although Klaeren was limited to the procedural due process right
to cross-examination at subordinate body special use public
hearings in small municipalities, Klaeren repeatedly has been
cited for changing the substantive due process standard of review
applicable to final special use decisions.
V. THE CONFUSION OF THE POST-KLAEREN COURTS
To date, four published opinions wrongly have cited Klaeren's
dicta discussion of Living Word for the proposition that final
decisions made by municipal legislative bodies are subject to a
legislative standard of review for substantive due process
purposes.
First, Gallik v. County of Lake'00 considered the
certified question whether a county board's denial of a conditional
use application was subject to a legislative or an administrative
standard of substantive review. 10 1 Although the question was
answered by a specific provision of the Counties Code (for which
there is no Municipal Code counterpart) providing that a county
98. See River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 166-67 (7th
Cir. 1994) ("Ihe procedures 'due' in zoning cases are minimal.... [The idea
in zoning cases is that the due process clause permits municipalities to use
political methods to decide, so that the only procedural rules are those local
law provides.").
99. See, e.g., Ronald S. Cope, Due Process in Zoning Hearings: Guidelines
for Complying with the Supreme Court's Mandate, 92 ILL. B.J. 88 (2004)
(describing Klaeren as a "mini-revolution in Illinois zoning law"); Victor P.
Filippini, Jr. et al., The Klaeren Case: Entering a Brave New World of Illinois
Zoning Law, at 1, http://www.iml.org/LegalSection/hracfKlaeren.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005) (observing that Klaeren "dramatically shook up the wellestablished procedures for granting certain site-specific zoning relief in
Illinois").
100. 781 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
101. See id. at 523.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:609

board's final decision is reviewable under the Administrative
Review Law, 102 the Illinois Court of Appeals, Second District,
proceeded to consider the non-binding dicta of Klaeren.103 The
Gallik court opined that, in Klaeren, the Illinois Supreme Court
"resolved the issue it had left open in Living Word' and held that a
legislative body acts administratively when it grants or denies a
special use application.' 0 4 Therefore, the court concluded, Klaeren
"would appear to have answered the certified question" in
Gallik.05
The Second District again improperly relied on Klaeren's
substantive due process dicta in Oak Grove Jubilee Center., Inc. v.
City of Genoa.' 06 There, the court considered whether a challenge
to the denial of a special use permit was subject to a legislative or
an administrative standard of substantive review. 107 The court
observed that, in Klaeren, the Illinois Supreme Court "abandoned
the traditional rule" that a legislative body acts legislatively when
it makes a final special use decision. 0 8 The court thus concluded
that, if it applied Klaeren to the present case, it "would be
compelled to hold that defendant [municipality] acted in an
administrative capacity in passing on plaintiffs application for a
special use permit."'109 The court declined to give retroactive
application to its misreading of Klaeren, however, on grounds that,
inter alia, municipalities could not have anticipated that the
Illinois judiciary would overturn the decades-old legislative
standard of substantive review.110
Third, in PACE v. Regional TransportationAuthority,"' the
Second District considered a challenge by PACE, a public
transportation entity, to a final budgetary decision by the Regional
Transportation Authority ("RTA"). Although the court held that
PACE did not have standing to bring a substantive due process
challenge, it still addressed the argument that the RTA's action
was subject to an administrative standard of substantive

102. See id. at 526 (citing 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-6007).
103. See id. at 524.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. 789 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
107. See id. at 841.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently issued a supervisory
order vacating the Second District's opinion and directing the court, inter alia,
to permit the parties to supplement their briefs to address the issue of
Klaeren's retroactive application. Oak Grove Jubilee Ctr., Inc. v. City of
Genoa, 796 N.E.2d 1059 (Ill. 2003). Thereafter, the Second District affirmed
its decision limiting Klaeren to prospective application. Oak Grove Jubilee
Ctr., Inc. v. City of Genoa, 808 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
111. 803 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
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The court stated that the "standard of review
review. 112
dichotomy" for reviewing a municipality's "ruling" on a special use
permit was addressed by Klaeren.113 Quoting Living Word, the
court described the post-Klaeren standard as follows: "When a
legislative body acts administratively," as it does when it makes a
final special use decision, that decision "is subject to general
114
principles of administrative review."
Finally, in Shipp v. County of Kankakee, 115 another Counties
Code case, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
considered a declaratory judgment challenge to a county
legislative body's denial of a special use permit application. The
court conceded that the "standard of review of the board's denial of
the permit [was] not relevant" to its holding and reversed the
decision of the trial court on grounds that the application was
incomplete." 6 Nevertheless, the court addressed the county's
argument that the legislative body's action was subject to a
legislative standard of substantive review. 117 The court rejected
that argument on grounds that, "in Klaeren, our supreme court
held that 'a legislative body acts administratively when it rules on
118
applications for special use permits."'
Although none of these cases actually incorporate Klaeren's
misguided dicta in a decisional rule, these cases are nonetheless
troubling because they erroneously cite that dicta as Klaeren's
holding. The sole issue identified and decided by each of the three
Klaeren courts is whether, as a matter of procedural due process,
the plaintiffs were entitled to cross-examine witnesses at a special
use public hearing conducted by a municipality having a
population less than 500,000. Applying basic principles of stare
decisis, Klaeren is authority only for the procedural due process
requirement of cross-examination at subordinate body special use
public hearings conducted by small municipalities. Klaeren is not
authority for the substantive due process standard to apply to a
final special use decision. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court itself
made this clear in the post-Klaeren decision, Hawthorne v.Village
of Olympia Fields,11 9 which expressly affirmed the established rule
in Illinois that a corporate authority's enactment of an ordinance
is a legislative act subject to a legislative standard of substantive

112. See id. at 22-23.
113. Id. at 22.
114. Id. (quoting Living Word, 749 N.E.2d at 925).
App. Ct. 2004).
115. 802 N.E.2d 284 (Ill.
116. Id. at 289.
117. See id.
118. Id. (quoting Klaeren III, 781 N.E.2d at 233). Although the Shipp court
cited Klaeren for this language, the true source is Living Word. Living Word,
749 N.E.2d at 925.
2003).
119. 790 N.E.2d 832 (Ill.
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review. 120
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISINTERPRETING KLAEREN

Citing Klaeren for a proposition that it does not and cannot
support violates basic principles of stare decisis. Stare decisis
limits the precedential scope of a judicial opinion and, in so doing,
realizes several important goals, including protecting reliance
interests, reducing the costs of the judicial system, and ensuring
equal treatment under the law.121 Stare decisis also limits the
ability of courts to make and apply law carelessly and arbitrarily,
which in turn promotes the judiciary's perceived legitimacy:
"Precedent provides a source external to the judges' individual
opinions that legitimizes their reasoning, supplying ready
evidence that judicial decisions are based on more than individual
whim." 122 Finally, the doctrine helps government order its
business and thereby minimizes the costs of compliance. 123 If the
judiciary does not consistently interpret laws, government has a
difficult time identifying its enforcement obligations and
determining its options for compliance.
The repeated misreading of Klaeren undermines all of these
important objectives. Citing Klaeren as authority for resolution of
an issue that the facts of the case did not present and that the
Klaeren court did not decide is precisely the sort of arbitrary and
careless decision-making that stare decisis is intended to prevent.
The development and application of case law based on a
fundamental misreading of Klaeren serves only to weaken public
confidence in the legal system.
Further, by perpetuating the notion that Klaeren changed the
basic standard of review applicable to a local legislature's decision
to grant or deny a special use permit, the misreading of Klaeren
imposes unjustified burdens on municipalities. It is one thing to
say that a public hearing is more akin to an administrative
hearing than a legislative hearing and thus requires some
opportunity for cross-examination as a matter of procedural due
120. Admittedly, Hawthorne's suggestion in a footnote that Hawthorne is
limited to variation decisions made by ordinance and does not apply to special
use permit decisions made by ordinance is puzzling. See id. at 832, 839 n.2.
However, Hawthorne did not present or resolve any issue regarding special
use permits and so the footnote commentary should not be considered
authoritative precedent. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
121. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 850-52 (1994).
122. Pintip Hompluem Dunn, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and
the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 493 (2003). See also
Caminker, supra note 121, at 853 (noting that if "the judiciary is perceived to
labor to ground its decisions on legal principles and not politics, its legitimacy

will endure").
123. See Caminker, supra note 121, at 852.
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process. It is quite another thing to say that the final decision of
the municipality's legislative body is subject to an administrative
standard of review instead of a legislative standard of review as E'
matter of substantive due process.
Under a legislative standard of substantive review, a final
special use decision is presumed valid and the party attacking it
bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that
it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without substantial relation to
124
In
the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare.
County
v.
Chicago
of
the seminal cases of La Salle National Bank
126
of Cook 125 and SinclairPipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park,
the Illinois Supreme Court identified eight factors that a
reviewing court must consider when determining if a party
127
These factors
challenging legislative action has met its burden.
neighboring
of
zoning
and
generally relate to the existing uses
community's
the
on
use
properties and the affect of the proposed
health, safety, and welfare. 128 Review of a legislative decision is de
novo, meaning that the reviewing court cannot consider the record
129
As a practical matter, then,
of the zoning proceedings at issue.
the issue under a legislative standard of substantive review is not
whether sufficient evidence was presented at the zoning
proceedings, but whether sufficient evidence exists anywhere to
support the legislative body's final decision.
The validity of a final special use decision is given less
deference under an administrative standard of substantive review.
124. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 145 N.E. 2d at 69.
125. Id.
126. 167 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. 1960).
127. See id. at 411; La Salle Nat'l Bank, 145 N.E.2d at 69.
128. The eight LaSalle-Sinclair Pipe factors are: (1) the existing uses and
zoning of nearby property; (2) the extent to which property values are
diminished by the particular zoning restrictions; (3) the extent to which the
destruction of property values of plaintiff promotes the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain to the public as compared
to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner; (5) the
suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes; (6) the length of time
the property has been vacant as zoned considered in the context of land
development in the vicinity of the subject property; (7) the community's need
for the proposed use of the property; and (8) the care with which the
community has undertaken to plan its land use development. Sinclair Pipe,
167 N.E.2d at 411; La Salle Nat7 Bank, 45 N.E.2d at 69.
129. See Yusuf v. Vill. of Villa Park, 458 N.E.2d 575, 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(finding error in the court's consideration of the transcripts of the zoning
proceedings that resulted in the challenged ordinance because the function of
a trial court in such circumstances is to consider "independent evidence as the
parties seek to introduce," not to rule on the adequacy or sufficiency of the
evidence that was presented in the underlying zoning proceedings); Anthony,
223 N.E.2d at 741 (ruling that the validity of a legislative body's decision to
approve or deny a special use application does not depend on the evidence
presented at the underlying zoning hearings).
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Under this standard, the final decision is invalid if it is "against
the manifest weight of the evidence." 130 In determining whether a
final administrative decision is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the decision is evaluated in light of specific standards
codified in the governing local zoning ordinance.13 1 Moreover, the
court's substantive review of a final administrative decision is
limited to the record of the proceedings conducted by the
32
municipality. 1
These differences demonstrate that much more is required of
a municipality when a final decision on a special use permit is
subject to an administrative, as opposed to a legislative, standard
of substantive review. Whereas the hearing record is inadmissible
in a substantive due process review of a legislative decision, the
record is the exclusive basis for review of an administrative
decision. Thus, when a municipality's final decision is subject to
an administrative
standard of substantive
review, the
municipality must be careful to preserve the record. This requires
it to create and store transcripts of proceedings, which can be
time-consuming and expensive. Moreover, because the validity of
an administrative decision is determined based exclusively on the
evidence in the record, the proceedings often become lengthy and
complex as participants seek to put in the record more and better
evidence than their opponents. In the end, the administrative
proceeding can consume a significant amount of public resources
at the expense of other issues equally deserving of the
municipality's attention.
The post-Klaeren courts' erroneous pronouncement that a
final decision on a special use permit is subject to an
administrative standard of substantive review also has important
negative implications for basic review and appeals procedures
implemented by municipalities. First, an administrative standard
of substantive review encourages municipalities to remove
legislatures from the special use process altogether. If a local
legislative body's decision is not presumed valid, as it is under a
legislative standard of substantive review, but instead is afforded
only the level of deference that a final decision by a subordinate
zoning board of appeals is afforded, there is no advantage in
involving the legislative body in the decision. Rather, it makes
130. N. Ave. Props., L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 726 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000); Weinstein v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 727 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).
131. See Wolbach v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 226 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ill.App. Ct.
1967); Weinstein, 727 N.E.2d at 658.
132. See N. Ave. Props., 726 N.E.2d at 68 (noting that, under an
administrative standard of substantive review, the reviewing court is 'limited
to reviewing the record which was before the agency and may not consider
'new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any
finding, order,
determination, or decision of the administrative agency"').
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more economic and administrative sense to authorize the
subordinate zoning board of appeals that is required to conduct the
precedent public hearing on a special use application to complete
the review process and to make the final decision on that
application.
Second, an administrative standard of review requires
municipalities to adopt and implement new appeals procedures.
Under a legislative standard of substantive review, an aggrieved
party may seek judicial review of a final decision immediately
after the decision is made without any further action by the
municipality. By contrast, under an administrative standard of
substantive review, the aggrieved party is required to exhaust all
administrative remedies before he may file a lawsuit challenging
the decision. Such administrative remedies must be provided by
the municipality and typically entail comprehensive review by
various government officials.
The administrative standard of substantive review requires a
far different process than a legislative standard of substantive
review. Thus, it is of critical importance that those circumstances
be properly and clearly defined when final decisions are subject to
an administrative standard of substantive review. The postKlaeren cases are cause for concern for these very reasons. By
mistakenly citing Klaeren for the proposition that a local
legislative body's decision on a special use permit is no longer
subject to a legislative standard of substantive review, the postKlaeren cases breed widespread confusion about the substantive
due process standard of review applicable to final special use
decisions. And by wrongly declaring that such decisions are now
subject to an administrative standard of substantive review, the
post-Klaeren cases encourage municipalities and citizens to change
their ordinary conduct with respect to special use applications and
unnecessarily to expend time and resources in an attempt to
satisfy a standard that does not apply.
VII. CONCLUSION
Adherence to basic principles of stare decisis is a prerequisite
to reliable judicial decision-making and the efficient operation of
government. By repeatedly misreading Klaeren as a substantive
due process decision, post-Klaeren courts have confused the
fundamental due process rights that Illinois municipalities must
guarantee their citizens. Further, by misstating the applicable
standard of substantive review, post-Klaeren courts have
frustrated the ability of Illinois municipalities to structure their
It is
zoning processes and for citizens to plan their affairs.
therefore imperative that the procedural due process ruling of
Klaeren be recognized as the only authoritative precedent of that
case.

